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THE MEANING OF DISSENT
Lee C. Bollinger*
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE. By Steven
H. Shiffrin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990. Pp. viii,
285. $29.95.

There is, and has always been, an abiding tension in first amendment theory. At times, freedom of speech is conceived as having a
very practical purpose - as implementing a system designed for yielding truth, or good public policy. Thus, Zechariah Chafee wrote that
the first amendment protects the "social interest in the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of
action but carry it out in the wisest way," 1 and Alexander Meiklejohn
spoke frequently of the first amendment as a practical plan for a selfgoverning society, engendering "wise decisions." 2 This vision of freedom of speech, however, does not lead to the conclusion that only
speech that can be shown to make a contribution to the search for
truth, or wise policy, receives protection. The speech we dislike and
believe harmful may still be offered shelter within the first amendment;
but, if it is, it will generally be regarded as a necessary evil, protected
because we recognize that we are fallible - we cannot eradicate
speech we perceive as harmful and debasing without diminishing that
which is beneficial.
Another way of envisioning the functions and roles of the first
amendment sees a protected realm of speech not as serving a quest for
immediate practical benefits, but rather as a special context in which
general qualities of mind and character are addressed and created.
Freedom of speech is more than a plan for developing good ideas
through uninhibited discussion. The enterprise has a far larger focus.
A close and sensitive examination of the canon of the first amendment reveals, I believe, both of these meanings. Often they occur in
the very same judicial opinion or scholarly writing. Both Justice
• Dean and Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.S. 1968, University of Oregon; J.D. 1971, Columbia. - Ed.
1. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941).
2. A. MEIKLEIOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in PoLmCAL FREE·
DOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1965):
Now, in that method of political self-government, the point of ultimate interest is not the
words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the
voting of wise decisions. The welfare of the community requires that those who decide
issues shall understand them. They must know what they are voting about. And this, in
tum, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and-interests relevant to the problem shall
be fully and fairly presented to the meeting.
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Holmes and Judge Hand, for example, extolled the practical benefits
achieved through freedom of speech, but they also pointed out how
the patterns of thinking underlying the censorship of their time revealed a troublesome cast of mind that required correction through
the conceptualizing of free speech. Behind the movement for censorship they saw an overweening certainty of belief, to which they responded with an antidote of heavy relativism in their conceptions of
free speech. They were concerned, as I have argued elsewhere,3 with
the intellectual character manifested in the specific context of free
speech disputes, and their response was to propose a competing intellectual attitude. And one would have to be insensible in reading
Meiklejohn's major writing on freedom of speech not to see him rebelling against the relativism of Holmes and Hand and proposing instead
a posture of confidence in one's beliefs and a use of free speech as a
means of testing one's commitments to those beliefs.4
It is not, of course, inconsistent to think of freedom of speech as
serving both the narrow and practical needs of the society and as providing a special context for the development of more general qualities.
One can cross a mountain range to reach the other side or to test one's
capacity for hardship or both. What is important is to understand
when and how these various functions are being served.
In my own efforts to explore the broader social significance of freedom of speech, I have tried to unpack the underlying attraction and
potential meaning of the extraordinary protection afforded to quite
harmful speech acts. It is possible, as noted above, to protect extremist speech because of the inability to draw safe lines. But it is also
possible to protect such behavior out of a recognition of the need to
master, or to moderate, a sensed impulse to disallow and crush acts
with which we disagree or which we view as harmful. Under this latter conception of freedom of speech, protection (or toleration) constitutes a kind of extreme sharing of social space, or of self-restraint in
the exercise of social legislation and punishment, all designed to influence the nature of social interaction more widely.
I

Professor Steven Shiffrin's book, 5 The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance, makes an important contribution to our efforts to
understand the broader cultural significance of the first amendment in
American society. Shiffrin conceives of freedom of speech as springing
from an important but overlooked strand of philosophy that he refers
to as the Romantic tradition. The Romantic tradition, like many
3. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 145-74 (1986).
4. For indications of this position, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2, at 27-28, 66-77.
5. Steven Shiffrin is Professor of Law at Cornell University.
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other philosophic traditions, is concerned with developing a way of
life, and so the first amendment, insofar as it embraces and emerges
from that tradition, is a means for doing things that express and symbolize a commitment to that way of life. To Shiffrin, what the first
amendment does best that is meaningfully related to the Romantic tradition is to "celebrate[] dissent" (p. 141). The celebration of dissent,
according to Shiffrin, is a central idea of the Romantic vision.
Shiffrin's account of the Romantic vision of life, however, is somewhat unclear. Romantics, Shiffrin says, take life in the following
terms:
Without purporting to capture the beliefs of any and all who have been
described as romantic (indeed, recognizing that some romantics do not
fit parts of this picture at all), let us understand romantics as those who
have sought to emphasize the passions against abstract reason; the subjective against the objective; the concrete and the particular against the
general and the universal; activity, dynamism, and movement against the
frozen, static, and eternal; creativity, originality, imagination, and spontaneity against mechanical calculation, rote analysis, or artificial, bloodless routine; invention over discovery; and struggle over victory. As
Isaiah Berlin puts it, the romantics stand for the "celebration of all forms
of defiance directed against the 'given' - the impersonal, the 'brute fact'
in morals or in politics or against the static and the accepted and [for]
the value placed on minorities ... as such, no matter what the ideal for
which they suffer."6

To Shiffrin, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman are the
most relevant Romantics for thinking about the relationship between
Romanticism and the first amendment. They, he contends, "understood more about the relationship of freedom of speech to American
democracy than did Oliver Wendell Holmes or Alexander Meiklejohn
.... " (p. 74). If so, one wonders whether Shiffrin's perspective springs
from his reading of first amendment jurisprudence or whether he is
recommending a new way of thinking about the first amendment derived from a neglected Romantic meaning. On this, Shiffrin is somewhat ambiguous. Shiffrin sometimes asserts that "as a cultural symbol
... the first amendment has enlivened, encouraged, and sponsored the
rebellious instincts within us all." 7 And he points to a case like West
Virginia v. Barnette, 8 the flag salute case, as most embodying the
Emersonian and Whitmanesque vision of freedom of speech. 9 Against
6. P. 141 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Berlin, Preface, in G. SCHENCK, THE MIND OP THE
xvi (1966)).
7. But, as a cultural symbol •.. the first amendment has enlivened, encouraged, and spon·
sored the rebellious instincts within us all. It affords a positive boost to the dissenters and
the rebels. It has helped to shape the kind of people we are, and it influences hopes about
the kind of people we would like to be.
P. 87.
8. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9. Pp. 159-61.
The very notion of citizenship, suggests Barnette, must leave space for an autonomous deciEUROPEAN ROMANTICS
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the levelling power of conformity challenged in that case, which demanded the expression of allegiance from every child, the first amendment intervened and taught respect for the value of dissent. But for
Shiffrin, it would seem, these instances are rare. To him the judicial
experience with freedom of speech is "depressing." Dissent has been
sadly unrespected - especially in periods when dissent's need for respect was highest:
Schenck introduces a long line of cases dealing with the advocacy of
illegal action. If Schenck is a sobering introduction, the whole line is
simply depressing. No one can read these cases without becoming increasingly cynical about the binding force oflegal doctrine and about the
willingness or capacity of the judiciary to protect dissent. The cases reveal a judiciary that mirrored the moods of the people. Judges, too, were
caught up in the hysteria of World War I; they too responded to the
anticommunist scare of the McCarthy era. In cooler times, they protected dissent. In the best of times and the worst of times, doctrine was
manipulated, shaped, and changed to serve the perceived needs of the
moment. Only rarely did judges transcend the censoring passions of the
day. [p. 73; footnote omitted]
Shiffrin also criticizes a number of important judicial decisions and
doctrines for failing to "celebrate dissent." George Carlin's ridiculing
on radio of society's attitudes toward four-letter words should have
been protected. 10 Public employees should have received more protection for speech in the workplace than the Supreme Court has permitted under Connick v. Myers. 11 There should be a first amendment
right to speak on private property, such as shopping malls, and a right
of access to the mass media (p. 100). And, in general, the first amendment's agenda should be seen both as broader than the protection of
"political" expression - because "dissent" is broader than politics and as narrower than the protection of "commercial" speech - because speech about trade has little to do with true "dissent" (p. 82).
Moreover, Shiffrin argues for a flexible first amendment, not bound in
by rigid rules, and he professes to be prepared to accept the risks of
chilling and judicial abuse so commonly associated with flexibility (pp.
150-51).
A commitment to the value of "celebrating dissent" then, according to Shiffrin, has serious implications. The world of the first amendment would look somewhat different than it does. Sometimes strains
sion about how closely to bond with one of our most important national symbols. Thus, if
there is to be any central constitutional understanding, it proceeds from a profound national
commitment to preserving dissent, encouraging free minds, and basking in the rich cultural
diversity that follows from such preservation and encouragement.... In short, the national
picture drawn by Barnette is Whitmanesque and Emersonian: it resonates strongly with the
romantic tradition.
P. 161 (footnotes omitted).
10. P. 80; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
11. Pp. 74-78; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

1386

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1382

of the Romantic perspective can be heard in the cases. But not frequently enough.
II

I have no doubt that Shiffrin has separated and called attention to
an important strand among the various threads of meaning that make
up the appeal of the first amendment, a value insufficiently appreciated
or developed in the cases or literature. At times, however, Shiffrin
seems not to recognize the independent significance of the "celebration
of dissent" theme he develops. Sometimes it seems as if he thinks he is
simply using this term as an umbrella label to incorporate, or to give
emphasis to, the purposes others have already identified with the first
amendment. At one point, for example, he says that the idea of dissent "serves to consolidate the values contained in the other stories" of
the first amendment (p. 167). At another point he asks himself
whether "dissent" is just a "proxy for other values" (p. 100). His answer is not entirely clear. But the answer should be that it isn't. And
he deserves credit for helping bring into focus a dimension to freedom
of speech unfortunately diminished by the modem mechanical, or formulaic, emphasis on the practical and pragmatic side of free speech
that I referred to at the outset.
But Shiffrin's project needs to be brought into sharper focus yet.
Two intertwined critical aspects of his interpretation require greater
development. The first is the way of life represented in the Romantic
tradition: Shiffrin needs to say more about the kind of life being proposed. He speaks of free speech protection of dissent as stimulating
"the rebellious instincts within us all" (p. 87), but it is not very clear
what those instincts translate into within the modem American social
and political system. The discussion is too often at too abstract a level.
It pits "passion" against "abstract reason," the "subjective" against
the "objective," the "concrete" against the "particular," and so on.
At some points the reader resists agreeing only because the issue (between the Romantic and other visions) has been posed at such a high
level of generality and with such loaded terms that agreement seems
coerced.
Shiffrin does present a picture of American society as filled with
nearly overwhelming pressures for conformity. He cites the educational system and television as primary forces (pp. 92-93). Against the
pressures, he argues, there is a deep wish for a more vital independence of mind, symbolized in the extraordinary protection under the
constitution for the radical and the nonconformist. Perhaps it is
enough to say just that. It is certainly interesting. But it also would
seem important to give more content to the image of what an "independent mind" or "rebellious instincts" would yield in the way of a
different life. Besides, the Romantic tradition, as Shiffrin articulates it,
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embraces far more than independent-mindedness. And, as to those
qualities of character and how they would look, there is too little as of
yet.
The second critical aspect in the argument needing some embellishment concerns the linkage between what is done in the context of
freedom of speech and the development of qualities of character. This
is, as I have acknowledged before, an unexplored area. How the
deeper cultural significances, or meanings, of free speech are transmitted from the specific practices of the first amendment to the broader
social arena is something of a mystery. It is not, it should be said, a
mysterious fact that how one behaves in one area of life will have an
effect on one's behavior in other areas. That is a commonplace understanding of human behavior. Jefferson's small farmer may make a better democrat; and English society may be different, and better off,
because it tolerates its eccentrics. But the precise link between what
one does in one setting and the development of general qualities is
frequently a mystery. And it certainly is a mystery when it comes to
thinking about the relationship between freedom of speech and the
American character. Shiffrin could help us out enormously if he could
explore that relationship more fully. 12
Perhaps I should make the point more generally: If the problem of
first amendment scholarship a few decades ago was that it seemed excessively concerned with the development of doctrine and too shallow
in its premises about the social purposes and functions of free speech,
the major problem for those today who wish to see the broader cultural significance of the first amendment is the failure to understand
this linkage between free speech and general cultural norms. The burden to make the cause and effect relationship come to life is properly
on those of us who believe that free speech is a way of life, or an
important element in a way of life.

III
Now I want to offer some general comments on one of the central
doctrinal ideas of the modem first amendment, namely the rule that
says that the level and method of analysis for regulations of speech, or
expression, will vary depending upon the state's motive, that is,
whether the regulation is directed at the "communicative impact" (or
the content) of the message communicated or at something else. As is
12. Even if we admit, then, that education inevitably produces some close-mindedness,
that it may irretrievably foreclose certain ways of looking at the world, that it identifies
certain values as malevolent, and that it channels, structures, and encourages other values, it
remains the case that American culture promotes, albeit in a culturally relative and constrained way, an open-mindedness, a willingness to challenge habits and traditions. Moreover, this promotion is nurtured by general conceptions of American democracy and by the
force of the first amendment as a cultural symbol.
P. 90.
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now widely understood, if a law is directed at controlling or prohibiting the content of speech, then the first amendment imposes a very
high burden of justification on the state. The law will be struck down
as unconstitutional unless the speech at issue falls into one of the recognized exceptions, such as obscenity, libel, clear and present danger,
and so on. If, on the other hand, the law is directed at regulating
something other than the message (for example, at controlling litter),
then, even though the law has an adverse impact on speech, the courts
will balance the interest of free expression against the state's interest
underlying the law. This approach does double duty: it answers the
question whether nonverbal expressive acts can be protected by the
first amendment (to which it says yes) and it provides a basic method
of analysis for dealing with regulations that have an impact on expression. There is no doubt that under this analysis the first amendment is
most concerned about regulations falling in the first level of analysis,
that is, those concerned with regulating the content of speech.
Shiffrin has a fairly lengthy and critical discussion of this analytical
approach (pp. 9-45). There are many cases, he points out, that are
part of the standing jurisprudence and yet don't fit the analysis. The
regulation of speech in the broadcast media and the speech of public
employees are two examples to which he points. He also notes how
the Court has invented certain categories of "low value" expression
that receive less protection even from regulations directed at content.
In general, he argues, whether the courts are considering regulations
directed at content or regulations directed at something else, they are
balancing - and that, he further says, is not necessarily bad.
I think Shiffrin's criticisms are, generally speaking, entirely proper.
The so- called two-track method of analysis, which distinguishes between regulation of the content of expression (the first track) and regulation of other matters (the second track), is often taken to be a more
powerful device than it is. It certainly does not provide a theory for
why regulations directed at content are more troublesome, from a first
amendment standpoint, than those that are not. (It is not at all clear,
for example, that regulations of content will cause greater "distortion"
of the "marketplace of ideas" than other regulations.) It begs the
question of what areas of speech can be directly regulated for their
content, for some concededly can (obscenity, libel, etc.); and it gives
little hint of how to go about "balancing" on the second track the free
speech interests against other state interests. As doctrine, the twotrack distinction is at best, it would seem, just a line to work with, and
it is a line with only partial explanatory power and no theoretical
backing.
But even as a line it is less helpful than it seems. By dividing up
the world of laws between those "directed" at the "content" or the
"communicative impact," of expression and those directed at other
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matters (such as preserving the appearance of public property), this
analytical approach not only fails to explain why the line it draws
should be significant for purposes of first amendment analysis but also
fails to see that the implementation of message-neutral laws may not
be content-neutral with respect to the "messages" emanating from the
behavior. Deterrence is, after all, an objective concerned with "communication." Furthermore, the process of deciding what punishment
is appropriate for a given violation often focuses on the state of mind
of the offender, both for assessing the harmfulness of the offense and
the likelihood of future violations, by this and other potential offenders. Beyond that, some laws - most notably civil rights laws - seek
to prevent behavior precisely because of the attitudes communicated
through the act of discrimination. In short, the more one looks at the
distinction assumed by the two-track system of analysis (between laws
concerned with the communicative impact of behavior and those that
are not) the less helpful it becomes in explaining our intuitions about
what laws are properly regarded as posing serious first amendment
problems and those that are not.
But there is an even more fundamental difficulty that needs to be
identified. The focus of the two-track analysis is on the motive behind
the regulation or the official action claimed to be a first amendment
violation. One of the things that has never been made clear is why
official motive should be such a powerful factor. It is true that the first
amendment analysis on the second track does not necessarily mean a
less rigorous application of first amendment interests, but that is the
way it is usually presented. The main problem, therefore, }Vi.th the
two-track method of analysis as a way of ordering the first amendment
universe is that it tends to direct our attention away from thinking
about what experience freedom of speech is supposed to provide within
the society. That is a more important inquiry, and a quite separate
inquiry, from figuring out when official motives are most troublesome.
IV

The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance is a valuable addition to the first amendment literature. It directs our attention towards the deeper meanings of the free speech experience. In doing so,
it offers support for what I would assume is a widespread intuition
that the dissident, the iconoclast, represents something powerfully appealing to the American personality. Focusing upon the intellectual
tradition of Emerson and Whitman provides a very useful means to
begin to understand that appeal.

